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ESSAY 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OR 
"COLLECTIVE BEGGING"?: REFLECTIONS 
ON ANTISTRIKEBREAKER LEGISLATION 
Samuel Estreicher* 
I. OVERVIEW 
Since at least the Supreme Court's 1938 opinion in Mackay Ra-
dio, 1 employers have had the right to hire permanent replacements 
for economic strikers as a means of maintaining operations during a 
strike. Despite continuous criticism in academic and organized la-
bor circles,2. this practice did not achieve widespread notoriety and 
result in calls for legislative change until the 1980s. The Reagan 
administration's 1981 firing of members of the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) for engaging in an illegal 
strike is often cited as lending encouragement to employers to win 
labor disputes - and break unions - .by permanently replacing 
strikers.3 During that decade, long-established bargaining relation-
ships - at Continental, Phelps Dodge, Boise Cascade, and Grey-
hound, to name a few - were severed in this manner. In April 
* Professor of Law, New York University. B.A. 1970, Columbia; M.S. (Industrial Rela-
tions) 1974, Cornell; J.D. 1975, Columbia. - Ed. This is a revised text of remarks initially 
given at the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools' Section on Labor 
and Employment Law in Washington, D.C., on January 5, 1991, and will be part of a book-
length work on U.S. labor law reform, tentatively entitled A Labor Law for Competitive 
Markets, forthcoming from Harvard University Press. For my earlier views on this subject, 
see Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. LAw. 897 (1987). I benefited from 
the opportunity to present this paper at the New York University Law School "Brown Bag" 
of February 26, 1993, and gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Filomen 
D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at New York University. 
1. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
2. For examples and analysis of this criticism, see infra Part II. 
3. See, e.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE RE.ruVENATION OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 33 (1993); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: 
THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 42 (1993); PAUL C. WEILER, 
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 19-20 (1990). AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Thomas Dona-
hue argues that employers "interpreted [President Reagan's response to the PATCO strikers] 
as a declaration of open season on unions and went all-out to block, weaken or be rid of 
them." Janice Castro, Labor Draws An Empty Gun, TIME, Mar. 26, 1990, at 56, 57 (quoting 
Mr. Donahue). On the PATCO strike, see generally Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 731 (1983), and Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise and Demise of PATCO, 37 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REv. 167 (1984). 
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1992, only the threat of job loss through permanent replacement 
persuaded workers on strike at Caterpillar to return to work after 
five months on the picket line.4 
The lesson the labor movement drew fr~m the experience of the 
1980s was that its institutional survival required repeal of Mackay 
Radio. On July 17, 1991, the House of Repr,esentatives passed a bill 
prohibiting employers from hiring or threatening to hire permanent 
replacements.5 In June 1992, a companion bill in the Senate failed 
by five votes to overcome Republican and business community op-
position. 6 With the election of a Democratic president in 1992 - a 
President who had pledged support for the so-called Workplace 
Fairness Act7 - the effort was renewed in the 103d Congress. On 
June 15, 1993, the renamed Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act 
passed the House,8 but in July 1994 the bill again failed to attract 
4. See Caterpillar Says It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 75, at A-17, A-18 (Apr. 17, 1992); Jonathan P. Hicks, Union Agrees To End Strike at 
Caterpillar: Company to Stop Trying to Hire Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at Al, 
A20. Protesting Caterpillar's restrictions on pro-union solicitation activities, the United Auto 
Workers {UAW) called a nationwide unfair labor practice (ULP} strike against the company 
in June 1994, and there are 120 complaints currently pending before the NLRB. The com-
plaints have been consolidated before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) James Rose who, on 
November 23, 1994, sustained violations alleged in four of the complaints concerning disci-
pline of employees for wearing t-shirts and other insignia that disparaged Caterpillar's man-
agement. See Caterpillar, Inc., Nos. 33-CA-10158 to 10161, 1994 NLRB LEXIS 945 (ALJ 
Nov. 23, 1994), described in NLRB Administrative Law Judge Supports UAW's ULP Claims 
Against Caterpillar Inc., Daily Lab. Rep. {BNA) No. 227, at D-12 (Nov. 29, 1994). On Janu-
ary 5, 1995, ALJ Rose found that the company violated the law in granting preferential treat-
ment to employees crossing picket lines during the 1992 walkout. See Caterpillar, Inc., Nos. 
33-CA-10038 & 10014, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 10 (ALJ Jan. 5, 1995), reprinted in Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA} No. 6, at E-6 (Jan. 10, 1995). Both Caterpillar and the union signaled a willing-
ness to resume talks, but the union has balked at the company's refusal to discuss the pending 
ULP charges. See Talks Between Caterpillar, UAW Uncertain as Union Rejects Company's 
Ground Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. {BNA} No. 7, at A-14 (Jan.11, 1995). The events surrounding 
the Caterpillar strike as of 1992 are usefully recounted in William R. Corbett, A Proposal for 
Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" 
Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L. REv. 813, 819-26 (1994). 
5. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. {1991}; see 137 CoNG. REc. H5518-90 (daily ed. July 17, 
1991) {debate and passage of bill}. 
6. S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991}; see 138 CoNG. REc. S7919-20, S7922-66 (daily ed. 
June 11, 1992} {debate and failure of cloture motion); Senate Fails to Invoke Cloture on 
Striker Replacement Bil~ Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA} No. 114, at A-10 (June 12, 1992). See infra 
note 107 for a discussion of the substitute bill offered by Senators Packwood and 
Metzenbaum. 
7. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. {1991); see 137 CoNG. REc. H5518, H5588-90 (daily ed. 
July 17, 1991). Paul Tsongas's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination foundered in 
Michigan and Illinois in April 1992 in part because Tsongas, unlike Bill Clinton, would not 
take the pledge to support the striker-replacement legislation. " 'I don't care who it is, where 
it is,' said Paul Giblin, Illinois legislative director for the United Auto Workers. 'If you're 
against that, that's apple pie and motherhood,.' " Robin Toner, Clinton Hopes Groundwork 
of 1991 Will Keep Him Rolling in the North, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1992, at A-17. 
8. See 139 CoNG. REc. H3568-69 {daily ed. June 15, 1993} (passage of H.R. 5 by 239-190 
vote). , 
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sufficient support in the Senate to terminate a threatened 
filibuster.9 
Despite the emergence of a Republican majority in both houses 
of Congress as a result of the 1994 election, the striker replacement 
issue is likely to continue to simmer in public policy debates over 
reform of federal labor law. Given the union movement's insistent 
claim that repeal of Mackay Radio is essential to redress a growing 
disparity in bargaining power between labor and management, and 
the controversy that continues to envelop labor disputes in which 
employers attempt to maintain operations by hiring permanent 
replacements, the question of what are the appropriate ground 
rules for economic conflict under the National-Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 (NLRA)10 remains very much alive. 
Ideally, reform of the rules governing strikes should not be 
viewed in isolation but as part of a comprehensive reexamination of 
federal labor law aimed at making the system work better in an era 
of competitive product markets. It makes a difference whether one 
considers the question assuming the continuation of the existing 
framework of adversarial labor relations, in which unions view 
themselves and are viewed by management as advancing an indus-
try-wide wage and job control policy often conflicting with the in-
terests of the particular firm. A different answer might be given in 
the context of an altered legal regime that promotes a better align-
ment of interest between the firm and the bargaining agency of its 
employees.11 Congress, however, has considered and is likely to 
continue to take up the strikebreaker issue separately and apart 
from a broader overhaul of the statutory scheme.12 The question 
9. See 140 CoNo. REc. S8844 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (53-46 vote on motion to close 
debate on S. 55). 
10. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). A sepa-
rate statute governs labor organization and collective bargaining in the railroad and airline 
industries. See Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 181-188 (1988). Although 
the structure of collective bargaining differs significantly under the RLA, the rules governing 
the reinstatement rights of strikers and the rights of replacement workers are virtually identi-
cal to those applicable to industries covered by the NLRA. See TWA, Inc. v. Independent 
Fedn. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432-42 (1989) (applying NLRA precedents to cases 
considering reinstatement rights of strikers under the RLA). 
11. In a book manuscript in progress, the broad outlines of which are sketched in Samuel 
Estreicher, Employee Voice in Competitive Markets, AM. PROSPECT, Su=er 1993, at 48, and 
Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 3 (1993), I consider the case for broader reform of the legal framework. 
12. Thus, for example, Secretary of Co=erce Ronald Brown and Secretary of Labor 
Robert B. Reich's Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, chaired by 
Harvard professor John T. Dunlop, was charged with the task of formulating reco=enda-
tions for a broad range of issues concerning reform of the framework for labor-management 
relations and means of improving productivity, employee participation, and nonlitigatory 
methods of dispute resolution - save for the issue of the reinstatement rights of strikers. See 
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therefore is, on the assumption that the basic structure of the labor 
laws will remain in place, is there a case for modifying the Mackay 
Radio doctrine? 
In my view, existing law should be modified, but not for the 
reasons typically given in the literature and by advocates of the 
Workplace Fairness bill. Those arguments ultimately cannot be rec-
onciled with the central premises of the NLRA, and they require a 
reassessment of first principles that the bill's proponents claim is 
unnecessary and thus avoid. Any justification for an isolated 
change of the rights of strikers and replacement workers - that 
leaves undisturbed all of the other central features of the scheme -
must be consistent with the existing statutory commitment to the 
mix of regulation and market forces that is captured by the phrase 
free collective bargaining. That is, workers have a right to insist on 
collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment and to 
promote their interests by engaging in strikes and other concerted 
activities, but they have no right as such to pursue their economic 
goals free of competitive forces in both labor and product markets. 
Continued adherence to the principle of free collective bargain-
ing requires, I argue, rejection of any per se prohibition of the hir-
ing of permanent replacements for economic strikers. If an 
employer cannot maintain operations by other means or withdraw 
its capital by relocating operations elsewhere, such a prohibition ef-
fectively insulates labor demands from market checks. The union-
ized firm will continue to face competition in product markets, but 
its ability to adjust its personnel practices to take account of the 
labor-cost advantages of competitors will tum on its ability to se-
cure union consent to reductions in labor costs. Some unions may 
promote industry-wage policies irrespective of the impact on the 
particular firm. Also, while many unions will not intentionally pur-
sue their dispute to the point of damaging the firm's competitive 
position, strikes may nevertheless cause such damage because they 
are often the result of bargaining failures - poor communication, 
mistrust, distortions in the incentives of union and management 
leadership, and the like. 
A flat-out ban on permanent replacements even when they are 
truly necessary to continue operations would represent an unprece-
dented instance in which the law gives a particular stakeholder a 
right to continue its dispute with the firm indefinitely while simulta-
Commission on the Future of Worker/Management Relations: Mission Statement, News 
(Office of Info., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 24, 1993, at 3. 
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neously preventing the firm from breaking the relationship and 
turning to a different party for the same resource. Such a rule 
would strengthen labor's position in many disputes - although this 
might be achieved only by a substantial worsening of the competi-
tive position of union-represented firms. In any event, legal inter-
vention to systematically improve outcomes for labor would require 
a broad examination of the costs and benefits of wealth redistribu-
tion through regulation of this type and reconsideration of the ex-
isting regime for collective labor relations. The essentially 
proceduralist case that advocates of strikebreaker legislation have 
made thus far is inadequate.13 
The question becomes whether under current conditions the 
statutory commitment to collective bargaining warrants any change 
in present law. In my view, with the sharp decline in union repre-
sentation from a high point of 35.7% in 1953 to under 13% of non-
agricultural workers in private firms today,14 unrestricted resort by 
employers to permanent replacements poses a serious threat to the 
institution of collective bargaining. Employers who can continue 
operations at prestrike levels with the use of management person-
nel or temporary help but who nevertheless hire - or threaten to 
hire - permanent replacements inflict a penalty on their striking 
employees without economic justification. Strategic use of perma-
nent replacements as a tool for breaking-collective organization has 
always been possible, but in an earlier period of high unionization 
rates, employers contemplating such a move faced a corresponding 
disincentive to replace strikers - the realistic prospect that its 
work force would ultimately re-unionize irrespective of the out-
come of any strike. Under current conditions, the risk of re-unioni-
zation has atrophied, and the potential benefits to employers of 
13. Advocates of repeal of Mackay Radio undoubtedly entertain a substantive agenda -
hoping that greater protections for strikers will enhance the ability of unions to produce 
distributional gains for their members - but the case for reform is most often pitched in 
terms of perfecting the statutory right to strike. See, e.g., GouLD, supra note 3, at 192-93 ("I 
think the notion that employees lose their right to reinstatement because they engage in 
protected activity confounds the statutory scheme and the promotion of freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining, which the preamble of the Act reminds us is still a basic pur-
pose of the statute."); WEILER, supra note 3, at 268-69 ("[W]orkers should not be forced to 
gamble their very jobs when they utilize the procedure prescribed by the national labor laws 
to break deadlocks in the process of free collective bargaining."). 
14. For data on trends in unionization rates, see LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION 
SouRCEBOOK app. A at A-1 (1985). In 1992, 12.7% of nonagricultural employees in private 
firms were represented by labor unions in collective bargaining. See Proportion of Union 
Members Declines to Low of 15.8 Percent, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at B-5 (Feb. 9, 
1993). In 1993, that figure fell slightly to 12.3%. See Number of Union Members Rose in 
1993 as Public Sector Grew, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at B-3 (Feb. 10, 1994). 
582 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:577 
strategic use of the Mackay Radio doctrine appear increasingly 
attractive. 
The objective of labor law reform in this area should be, then, to 
minimize strategic use of the Mackay Radio doctrine, while retain-
ing the beneficial market check on unreasonable union demands 
that the employer's ability to operate with replacements provides. 
One approach commonly offered in the literature would be to re-
quire a showing by employers that operations could not be main-
tained by temporary help or other means as a prerequisite to the 
hiring of permanent replacements.15 I favor such a prior showing of 
business necessity, provided, however, that a mechanism is avail-
able for a prompt administrative determination early on in the 
strike and that the inquiry takes account of the employer's custom-
ary educational, skill, and motivational requirements for the posi-
tions in question. 
For situations in which employers will be able to make a con-
vincing showing that operations cannot be maintained with tempo-
rary workers, there is still a need for a moratorium period during 
which the process of collective bargaining can operate with some 
insulation from market forces. Here, I would follow the approach 
that until recently was the law in Ontario: allowing strikers to re-
turn to their jobs for a period of up to six months, even if replace-
ments have been hired. Six months is a sufficiently long time to 
ensure that both sides feel the signaling and informational effects of 
a strike and to minimize any strategic use of Mackay Radio. 
II. FALSE STARTS 
Critics of the existing rule on striker replacements offer some 
variant of one or more of the following positions: (i) the language 
in the Supreme Court's Mackay Radio decision recognizing the em-
ployer's right to hire permanent replacements should be dismissed 
as aberrational dictum inconsistent with the fundamentals of the 
NLRA (the "aberrational dictum" thesis); (ii) the statutory right to 
strike in sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA 16 is flatly inconsistent with 
15. See, e.g., GouLD, supra note 3, at 193 ("My judgment is that Congress should overrule 
Mackay altogether. But at a minimum there ought to be a presumption that temporary 
replacements are sufficient to protect the employer's interest."); WEILER, supra note 3, at 267 
("At a minimum, then, the law should be changed to require an employer to prove that it 
actually needed to promise permanent tenure to replacements in order to maintain its opera-
tions before permitting such a serious inroad on the Section 7 rights of striking employees."); 
Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 
106 HARv. L. REv. 669 {1993). 
16. 29 u.s.c. §§ 157, 163 {1988). 
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and should override the employer's ability to maintain operations 
by hiring permanent replacements (the "rights" thesis); (iii) the use 
of permanent replacements produces labor strife, prolongs labor 
disputes, and provokes attendant violence - hence, such use is in-
consistent with the statutory goal of promoting industrial peace (the 
"industrial peace" thesis); and (iv) the use of permanent replace-
ments tips the scales too much in management's favor and for that 
reason should be prohibited (the "balance of power" thesis). None 
of these views, I submit, can be squared with the existing statutory 
commitment to "free collective bargaining." 
A. The "Aberrational Dictum" Thesis 
In Mackay Radio, the Supreme Court sustained a National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) order requiring reinstatement of six 
strikers on the ground they had been discriminatorily denied rein-
statement. The company had rehired scores of the strikers but 
barred reinstatement to the six complainants who led the strike. 
This was a clear case of discrimination, and nothing more need have 
been said. The Court nevertheless offered its understanding that 
the NLRA does not restrict the ability of an employer, otherwise 
free of unlawful conduct, to maintain operations with the aid of per-
manent replacements: 
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employe[e]s 
with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although § 13 pro-
vides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with 
or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not fol-
low that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has 
lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places 
left vacant by strikers. And it is not bound to discharge those hired to 
fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume 
their employment, in order to create places for them. The assurance 
by [the employer] to those who accepted employment during the 
strike that if they so desired their places might be permanent was not 
an unfair labor practice nor was it such to reinstate only so many of 
the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled.17 
There is a tendency at least in the academic literature to dismiss 
this language as an aberration - as ill-considered dicta.18 But this 
was a case of dictum that simply recognized what all understood at 
the time to be the reach of the statute. Indeed, even the rather pro-
17. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 {1938) {footnote omitted). 
18. See, e.g., Juuus G. GEIMAN & BERTRAM B. PoGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE 
BASIC PROCESSES, LAw AND PRACTICE 139 {1988); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Tum It 
Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295, 299-300 (1991). 
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union Labor Board of that period, in its reply brief in the Mackay 
Radio litigation, acknowledged: 
The Board has never contended, in this case or in any other, that an 
employer who has neither caused nor prolonged a strike through un-
fair labor practices, cannot take full advantage of economic forces 
working for his victory in a labor dispute. The Act clearly does not 
forbid him, in the absence of such unfair labor practices, to replace 
the striking employees with new employees or authorize an order di-
recting that all strikers be reinstated and the new employees dis-
charged. Admittedly the strikers are not "guaranteed" reinstatement 
by the Act. ... Admittedly an employer is fully within his rights under 
the statute in refusing to reinstate striking employees when he has 
legally filled their positions .... The Board did not question that right 
in this case.19 
The Board's concession20 plainly reflected the legislative history 
of the NLRA. Senator Wagner's initial bill in 1934 would have ex-
cluded replacements from the statutory definition of employee. 21 In 
a revised bill introduced in conjunction with Senator David I. Walsh 
of Massachusetts - a bill that became the basis for the NLRA as 
enacted - Wagner deleted the exclusion of striker replacements 
from the law's protection.22 A Senate committee document23 ac-
19. Reply Brief for the NLRB at 15-18, Mackay Radio (No. 37-706). 
20. Professor Christopher Tomlins, who writes about American labor history from a left-
wing, critical legal studies perspective, acknowledges that Mackay Radio's position on the 
reinstatement of economic strikers "had been established Board policy for some time." 
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND 
TiiE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 261 n.32 (1985). Referring 
to the precedents of the first NLRB established under Resolution No. 44, ch. 677, 48 Stat. 
1183 (1934), Professor Irving Bernstein notes: "Where a strike was caused by the employer's 
violation of 7(a), [the] NLRB returned the workers to their jobs without prejudice. Where 
there was no such breach, strikers had no legal claim to restoration." IRVING BERNSTEIN, 
THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 85 & n.7 (1950). 
21. See S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(3) (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OFTiiE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter LEOIS. 
HIST.] ("(T]he term 'employee' shall not include an ,individual who has replaced a striking 
employee."). 
22. See S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEOJS. HIST., supra note 21, at 
1070 (amended version of S. 2926, which deletes the striker replacement exclusion and pro-
vides a new definition of employee); S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 
1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 21, at 1070-71 (reporting the second print of S. 2926, which in-
cludes the deletion of the striker replacement exclusion); see also 18 CoNo. REc. 9607 (1934). 
23. SENATE CoMM. ON EDuc. AND LABOR, 74rn CoNo., lST SESs., MEMORANDUM COM· 
PARINGS. 1958, SEVENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, A BILL INTRODUCED BY SENA· 
TOR WAGNER ON FEBRUARY 21, 1935, To CREATE A NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, WITH THE BILL REPORTED BY SENATOR WALSH ON MAY 26, 
1934, AS A SUBSTITUTE FORS. 2926, SEVENTY-TiilRD CoNGRESS, ALSO INTRODUCED BY SEN· 
ATOR WAGNER (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 21, at 1319 [here-
inafter MEMORANDUM CoMPARING s. 1958 TO REVISED VERSION OF s. 2926]. According to 
New Deal labor historian Irving Bernstein, this committee report, drafted by NLRB general 
counsel Calvert Magruder and his assistant Philip Levy at the request of Senator Walsh, is 
"the best guide to the meaning of the Wagner Act." BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 90-91 n.27. 
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companying the version of the bill introduced in the next Congress 
explained the revised definition of employee: 
The broader definition of "employee" in S. 1958 does not lead to 
the conclusion that no strike may be lost or that all strikers must be 
restored to their jobs, or that an employer may not hire new workers, 
temporary or permanent, at will. All that is protected here is the right 
of those in a current labor dispute or strike to participate in elections, 
to be free from discrimination in reinstatement after they have agreed 
to return on the employer's terms, to collective bargaining, to free-
dom from interference, restraint, or coercion, etc.24 
As Irving Bernstein observes in his study of New Deal collective 
bargaining policy: "Under S. 1958 ... the employer remained free 
to refuse to rehire strikers or to take on replacements during a stop-
page so long as his purpose was not discriminatory."25 
Even if there were any doubt about the congressional under-
standing in 1935, the dictum of Mackay Radio was essentially codi-
fied in later amendments to the NLRA. Congress in the Taft-
Hartley amendments of 194726 further entrenched the principle by 
disenfranchising permanently replaced workers. Section 9(c)(3)27 
provided that employees who were permanently replaced during 
economic strikes lost ·entirely their right to vote in NLRB elec-
tions28 - the opposite of the position Wagner had initially taken. 
This was one of the provisions that prompted President Truman's 
unsuccessful veto.29 In 1959, a limited re-enfranchisement oc-
curred:30 replaced strikers eligible for reinstatement could vote for 
24. MEMORANDUM COMPARING s. 1958 TO REVISED VERSION OF s. 2926, supra note 23, 
at 21, reprinted in 1 LEms. HIST., supra note 21, at 1346. The language quoted in the text 
appears to be from an analysis prepared by William M. Leiserson, who worked closely with 
Senator Wagner when Leiserson was executive secretary of the National Labor Board, which 
the Senator chaired during the National Industrial Recovery Act period. BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 20, at 58; see MEMORANDUM COMPARING s. 1958 TO REVISED VERSION OF s. 2926, 
supra note 23, at 6, 15-25, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 21, at 1327, 1338-46. 
25. BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 92. 
26. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988)). 
27. LMRA, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 101, § 9{c)(3), 61Stat.136, 144 (1947) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. § 159{c){3) (1988)). 
28. Tomlins suggests that§ 9{c){3) merely codified NLRB practice: 
Wage and hour strikers had lost the right to vote in Board elections well prior to passage 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, and in fact the Board continued to follow the same 
policy of only allowing such strikers to vote in cases where it was unclear whether or not 
they had been validly replaced. 
TOMLINS, supra note 20, at 293-94 {footnote omitted). 
29. See 93 CoNG. REc. 7485-86 {1947) (reporting President Truman's veto message, 
which refers disapprovingly to the denial of a vote to strikers). 
30. As enacted in 1947, § 9{c)(3) provided: "Employees on strike who are not entitled to 
reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote." LMRA, Pub. L. No. 80-101, Sec. 101, § 9(c)(3), 
61 Stat. 136, 144 {1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159{c)(3) (1988)). As a result of the 
Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959, § 9{c){3) now provides in relevant part: "Employees 
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up to one year from the commencement of a lawful economic 
strike.31 
Finally, if the language from Mackay Radio is dictum, it also 
enjoys the unique status of having been the foundation for at least 
five other major Supreme Court opinions spelling out its 
implications. 32 
B. The "Rights" Thesis 
Critics of Mackay Radio also insist that the "right to strike," en-
shrined in sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA,33 is rendered meaning-
less if lawful economic strikers can lose their jobs for exercising that 
right. This· view holds that it is to draw a distinction intelligible only 
to lawyers - indeed, only to labor lawyers - to say that workers 
have a statutory right to strike and yet may lose their jobs if they 
exercise that right. If we are to have a conceptually coherent right 
to strike, the argument goes, Mackay Radio must be repealed.34 
There is undoubtedly a good deal of rhetorical force to the 
point. Nevertheless, workers do have a meaningful - if arguably 
engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote 
under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provi-
sions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commence-
ment of the strike." Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 7CY2, 73 Stat. 519, 542 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c)(3) (1988)). The Conference Committee rejected the House bill, H.R. 8342, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1959), see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38, 
reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2509-10 (omitting broader language of H.R. 8342), which 
would have provided for a flexible case·by-case approach to the voting rights of replaced 
strikers. See H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1959), reprinted in 1959 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2448. The NLRB subsequently rejected the argument that because replaced 
strikers have contingent rights to reinstatement under NLRB v. Fleetwood 'frailer Co., 389 
U.S. 375 (1967), and Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B.1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), they are "entitled" to reinstatement and hence eligi-
ble to vote even beyond the 12-month period. See Levitz Furniture Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 15 
(1980); Wahl Clipper Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 634 (1972). 
31. See Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 7CY2, 73 Stat. 519, 542 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c)(3) (1988)). 
32. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); TWA, Inc. v. 
Independent Fedn. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 
491 (1983); NLRB v. Fleetwood 'frailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor 
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). . 
It is a mistake, however, to infer from this history that the strikers' exposure to perma-
nent replacement is a reflection of management's property rights or an abstractly conceived 
absolute right to maintain operations. The prohibition of superseniority offers to lure 
replacements, the rule against hiring permanent replacements during an offensive bargaining 
lockout, the Board's rule against offering replacements better terms than the last offer to the 
union, and the antidiscrimination principle adverted to in the quote from the NLRA legisla-
tive history, see supra text accompanying note 24, all are examples of limits on the weapons 
management can employ to further the objective of staying open for business. See generally 
Estreicher, supra note*, at 901-03. 
33. 29 u.s.c. §§ 157, 163 (1988). 
34. For a particularly forceful expression of this view, see GouLD, supra note 3, at 192-93. 
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incomplete - right to strike in that (i) they cannot be fired for the 
act of striking; (ii) they can return to work at any point until perma-
nent replacements have assllined their positions; and · (iii) in the 
event that such replacements have 'been hired and· the union does 
not secure a return-to-work agreement, they have the right to pref-
erential reinstatement- with full seniority and benefits - for jobs 
that open up in the poststrike period.3S 
Whatever may be the nierits of adding additional protections to 
this list, we should be skeptical of rights-based arguments for doing 
so. Consider, first, the other rights-holders: management is 
thought to have a right to maintain operations.36 Moreover, as 
David Westfall has written, employees wishing to return to work 
also have a right to abandon the strike, and new hires have a similar 
right to work on the terms offered the striking union.37 It is not 
clear by what method we are to reconcil~ competing rights·. Ulti-
mately, each of these rights is derived from a particular statutory 
scheme, and each takes its full measure of support from that 
scheme. · 
Second, there is nothing inherent in the concept of the "right to 
strike," as such, that requires any particular rule on strike replace-
ments. Certainly, as Quebec38 - and, more recently, Ontario39 -
has legislated, the right to strike could mean that the employer may 
not seek to maintain operations witli the use. of nonmanagerial la-
bor of any kind, even temporary help, except in certain exceptional 
35. See NLRB v. Fleetwood nailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 
N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). 
An open issue is whether an employer can recall laid-off teplacements'before recalling more 
senior unreinstated strikers. Compare Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 742,.745 (1981) 
(finding a violation where the employer gives general recall preference to laid-off replace-
ments over unreinstated strikers), enforcement denied, 675 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1982) with 
Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1110 (1988) (allowing priority tb be given to laid-off 
replacements unless, based on "objective factors,'' they had "no reasonable expectancy of 
recall"), enforced, 910 F.2d 1487 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1238 (1991). Aqua-
Chem is soundly criticized in Matthew W. F'mkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the 
Economic Strike, 1990 U. lu.. L. REv. 547, 561-62, and D9uglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked 
Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 41 KAN. L. REv. 363, 393-98 (1992). 
36. See, e.g., DANIEL V. YAGER, LoADING THE SCALES: Is THE BALANCE BE1WEEN THE 
RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE RioHTTO OPERATE IN NEED OF REFoRM? (1993); John S. Irving, 
Permanent Striker Replacements Should Not Be Banned, Govr. UNION REv., Spring 1993, at 
1, 3. 
37. See David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. 
LAW. 137, 156-58 (1991). 
38. See An Act to amend the Labour Code and the Labour and Manpower Department 
Act, ch. 41, 1977 S.Q. 635-36, amended by ch. 52, 1978 S.Q. 687-88; ch. 37, 1982 S.Q. 801-02; 
ch. 22, 1983 S.Q. 199-200; ch. 12, 1985 S.Q. 289-90; ch. 95, 1986 S.Q. 1074-75; ch. 85, 1987 
S.Q. 1510; and ch. 61, 1992 S.Q. 1054. 
39. See Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. L.2, §§ 73.1-.2 (Jan. 1993). 
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circumstances. At the other extreme, as was the case under British 
law, it could simply mean a legal immunity - a freedom from 
"back to work" injunctions and tort law liability for interference 
with the conduct of a business.40 There are also many positions that 
lie between these two poles. 
Some commentators have attempted to bolster the "rights" the-
sis by arguing that the United States stands alone among civilized 
developed nations in refusing to protect the jobs of economic strik-
ers.41 The claim is significantly overstated, as our law on strikers 
and replacements is not materially different from - and in some 
40. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971, ch. 72, modified the common law position by 
providing limited protection against selective dismissal or selective rehiring that discrimi-
nated against union activists: 
[T]he Act was not permitted to undermine the ultimate power of the employer in a 
labour dispute,.with sections 25 and 26 expressly providing special rules for the dismissal 
of those taking part in a lock-out or a strike. In either case a dismissal would not be 
regarded as unfair unless it could be shown, first, that an employer had been selective in 
his dismissal or re-engagement of those taking part in the strike or lock-out; and, sec-
ondly, that those dismissed or not re-engaged had been selected because of their union 
membership or activities. The bottom line then was that a dismissal in the course of a 
strike was not unfair save for the victimization of union activists. 
K.D. EWING, THE RIGHT TO S1RIKE 41 (1991); see Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, The Effect of Indus-
trial Action on the Status of the Individual Employee, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A CoMPAR· 
ATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 176, 202-04 (Benjamin Aaron & K.W. Wedderburn eds., 1972). The 
British Labour government repealed the 1971 legislation but in the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act of 1978, ch. 44, only slightly expanded the protection against selective 
dismissal: 
It was only if the employer selectively dismissed or selectively re-engaged (for any rea-
son - not just union membership or activities as before) any of those who had partici-
pated in the action that a complaint of unfair dismissal could be made. But even in such 
a case the dismissal would not necessarily be unfair for the complaint would have to be 
determined on established principles. And even if this were to lead to a holding of 
unfair dismissal, it is almost inconceivable that an employee would be successfully rein-
stated into his employment by a tribunal. 
EWING, supra, at 42. With the return of the Conservative Party to power, the Employment 
Act of 1982, ch. 46 (Eng.), substantially diluted the prohibition of selective dismissal by al-
lowing employers selectively to reengage striking workers after a period of three months had 
elapsed from the dismissal of the work force, and by allowing employers to dismiss only those 
who were on strike on the date of their dismissal, without dismissing those who had returned 
to work during the strike. See Ewing, supra, at 44-45. 
The Employment Act of 1990, ch. 38, further narrowed the protection against selective 
rehiring when the workers strike without the authorization of their union. See SHELDON 
LEADER, FREEDOM OF AssOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND PoLmCAL THEORY 194 
(1992). Professor - now NLRB Chair - William Gould believes that British law forbids 
permanent replacement of workers engaged in an authorized strike but does not cite author-
ity for his reading. See GouLD, supra note 3, at 200-01. 
41. See, e.g., GouLD, supra note 3, at 198-201; Finkin, supra note 35, at 569-71; cf. Kath-
erine Van Wezel Stone, Legal Regulation of Economic Weapons: A Comparative Perspective, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR§ 5.7, at 79 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS] (stating 
that in France, Germany, and parts of Canada, legal rules provide employees with "greater 
ability to exercise their market power on a collective basis"). 
December 1994] Reflections on Antistrikebreaker Legislation 589 
respects is more protective of strikers42 than - that of Great 
Britain.43 
In any event, reliance on the experience of other countries is 
invariably a hazardous enterprise. Too often comparative-law argu-
ments involve isolating a piece of the foreign scheme that' is thought 
worthy of emulation without transplanting the entire framework -
including institutional arrangements and legal culture - that 
makes the scheme work in the other country.44 Thus, for example, 
we cannot derive a great deal of guidance from a country like Ger-
many, which recognizes the right to strike but relies on a two-tier 
system of (i) multienterprise regional or national collective bargain-
ing to establish minimum terms of employment acceptable to mar-
ginal firms within employer federations, and (ii) supplementation of 
collective agreements through essentially collaborative dealings 
with enterprise-based works councils that are prohibited by law 
from striking.4s · 
Among decentralized bargaining systems somewhat similar to 
our own, there is considerable variation in the rules governing 
strikes. Great Britain's law, as previously mentioned, is more pro-
tective than our own with respect to the reinstatement of economic 
strikers.46 Japanese law apparently bars permanent replacements,47 
but the labor relations system is based on enterprise unionism and 
other collaborative features that place strikes by Japanese workers, 
in terms of their incidence and average duration, at the low end 
42. Our law does not, for example, allow wholesale dismissal of strikers but rather out-
laws dismissal as such and provides for contingent reinstatement rights for replaced strikers. 
See supra text accompanying note 35. Individual British workers also face damages liability 
for engaging in unauthorized strikes or strikes in violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, see Stone, supra note 41, § 5.4.1, which would be barred here, see Complete Auto 
Tran~it, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981). 
43. See supra notes 40 & 42. 
44. The best writing on this subject remains Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law, 37 Moo. L. REv. 1 (1974). See also Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal 
Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 310 (1985) (discussing the proper role of 
comparative law in the specific field of unjust dismissal statutes). For the argument of a 
management advocate along these lines, see YAGER, supra note 36, at 161-77. 
45. See Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, supra 
note 11, at 15-17. 
46. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
47. This appears to be the implication of KAzuo SuGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAw 542 
(Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992) ("An employer's discharge, discipline or other disadvantageous 
treatment of workers because of their participation, as leaders or supporters, in proper dis-




Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:577 
and certainly in comparison to the United 
Sharing a common law system, a common border, and, increas-
ingly, a common market with the United States, Canada provides a 
more instructive comparative-law experience. Several provincesso 
and the Federal Labour Code (as interpreted)51 bar the use of per-
manent replacements; both Ontario52 and Quebec53 also generally 
prohibit use .of temporary help and management brought in from 
other sites to perform struck work. The Canadian experience -
discussed below54 - is certainly relevant to the policy debate here, 
but it hardly makes American law on strikers and replacements an 
anomaly among civilized nations. The case for change has to be 
made on other terms. 
C. The "Industrial Peace" Thesis 
There is a suggestion in the literature on strikebreaker legisla-
tion that repeal of Mackay Radio might serve to reduce industrial 
strife.ss The NLRA's statement of purposes indeed cites industrial 
peace as an overriding objective of the legislation.s6 The statute has 
48. See, e.g., Tadashi Hanami, Conjiir;t Resolution in Industrial Relations, in INDUSTRIAL 
CoNFLICf REsoLUTION IN MARKET ECONOMIES 203, 210-11 & tbl. 3 (T. Hanami & R. 
Blanpain eds., 2d ed. 1989); Taishiro Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CoNTEMPO· 
RARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 117, 136-37 & tbl. 5.5 (Taishiro Shirai ed., 1983). 
Official strike statistics do not reflect, however, the use by Japanese unions of short, largely 
symbolic work stoppages of a day or two of duration, and work-to·rule forms of protest. See 
Hanami, supra, at 210-11 & tbl. 4. 
49. See, e.g., MAsANoru HAsHJMOTO, THE JAPANESE LABOR MARKET IN A CoMPARA· 
TIVE PERSPECTIVE WITII 11iE UNITED STATES 54-57 & figs. 3.7-3.8 (1990). 
50. See H.R. 4552 and thi; lssue of Strike Replacements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Labor-Management Relations qf the House Comm. on Education and Labor, lOOth Cong., 2d 
Sess. 41-45, 50-65 (1988) (statements of Brian Langille, Professor, University of Toronto Law 
School) (summarizing provincial liiws). 
51. See Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. L-1, § 8 (1974), amended by ch. 39, 1987 S.P.E.I. 121; 
Canadian Air Line Pilots' Assn., 5 C.L.R.B. Rep. 368, 407-10 (1983). 
52. See Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. L.2, §§ 73.1-2 (Jan. 1993). 
53. See An Act to amend the Labour Code and the Labour and Manpower Department 
Act, ch. 41, 1977 S.Q. 635-36, amended by ch. 52, 1978 S.Q. 687-88; ch. 37, 1982 S.Q. 801-02; 
ch. 22, 1983 S.Q. 199-200; ch. 12, 1985 S.Q. 289-90; ch. 95, 1986 S.Q. 1074-75; ch. 85, 1987 
S.Q. 1510; and ch. 61, 1992 S.Q. 1054. 
54. See infra text accompanying note 61. 
55. See DAVID CARD & CRAIG A. OLSON, BARGAINING POWER, STRIKE DURATION, AND 
WAGE OUTCOMES: AN ANALYSIS OF STRIKES IN nm 1880s, at 27, tbl. 7 (Princeton Univ. 
Indus. Relations Section Working Paper No. 294, 1992}; John F. Schnell & Cynthia L. 
Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between Employers' Striker Replacement Strategies and 
Strike Duration, 47 !Nous. & LAB. REL. REv. 189, 203 (1994); Craig A. Olson, The Use of 
Strike Replaceme~ts in Labor Disputes: Evidence from the 1880s to the 1980s, at 17 & tbl. 2 
(Mar. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 11uthor). · 
56. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
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succeeded in replacing an administrative procedure for strikes over 
recognitional disputes, and in encouraging the use of arbitration to 
resolve disagreements over the interpretation of collective bargain-
ing agreements. It is less clear, however, that the statute is designed 
to eliminate economic conflict as such. Disagreements resulting in 
occasional strikes and lockouts are thought to be an unavoidable 
part of the process of collective bargaining.s1 
Even if we assume, for the moment, that the NLRA also gener-
ally seeks to reduce economic conflict~ it is questionable whether 
enhancing a union's ability to maintain a strike indefinitely will re-
duce the incidence or duration of strikes. The "joint costs" theory 
of strikes in the economic literature argues that strikes will be used 
less by the parties when the joint costs to both parties is high rela-
tive to the cost of other mechanisms for resolving their differ-
ences.58 This theory offers no firm prediction as to the likely effects 
of strikebreaker legislation. Such .a law makes strikes more costly 
to firms - by increasing output losses - and less costly to workers. 
It may improve labor's bargaining power and may affect relative 
wages.59 But in theory, strike incidence and duration should not be 
affected by a policy change that leaves undisturbed the joint costs to 
both parties of a strike.60 
In practice, the effects of such laws may be quite different. The 
Canadian experience here may be instructive. · A recent empirical 
study conducted by Professors Morley Gunderson; Angelo Melino, 
and Frank Reid of the University of Toronto finds that the impact 
57. See generally NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (stating 
that the NLRB generally lacks authority to regulate weapons of economic conflict because 
the NLRA views conflict as part of the process of collective bargaining). 
58. On the joint-costs model of strikes, see John Kennan, Pareto Optimality and the Eco-
nomics of Strike Duration, 1 J. LAB. REs. 77 (1980), and Melvin W. Reder & George R. 
Neumann, Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 867 (1980). 
59. To the contrary, reviewing the Canadian experience, Professor John Budd of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota finds that "there is no evidence to support the contention that the pres-
ence of legislation affecting the use of strike replacements significantly alters relative 
bargaining power and the wage determination process or significantly impacts strike activ-
ity." JOHN W. BUDD, CANADIAN STRIKE REPLACEMENT LEGISLATION AND CoLLECITVE 
BARGAINING: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 21-22 (University of Minn. Indus. Relations 
Ctr. Working Paper No. 93-08, 1993). 
60. 
In essence, a policy should reduce the expected duration of a strike if it reduced uncer-
tainty by making information public or if it increased the joint cost to both parties of 
using the strike as opposed to other mechanisms. The policy may also have a differential 
impact on bargaining power, but as long as that is recognized by both parties, it would 
have implications for wages but not for strike durations. 
Morley Gunderson & Angelo Melino, The Effects of Public Policy on Strike Duration, 8 J. 
LAB. ECON. 295, 297-98 (1990). 
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of anti-"scab" legislation in Canada has been to increase, rather 
than decrease, both the incidence and duration of strikes: 
Certainly the most controversial policy variable is the anti-scab 
legislation, which prohibits the use of replacement workers during a 
strike. Such legislation exists only for 13 percent of our contracts, 
essentially in Quebec since 1977. Somewhat surprisingly, our results 
indicate that the legislation is associated with statistically significant 
and quantitatively large increases in both strike incidence and dura-
tion and hence overall strike activity. This is surprising because the 
legislation was introduced in part to curb the picket line violence and 
animosity that otherwise could convert a peaceful, short-duration 
strike into a violent, long-duration one as picketers were confronted 
with replacement workers. As well, prohibitions on replacement 
workers should increase the cost of the strike to employers by remov-
ing their option of carrying on production by using replacement work-
ers (albeit this may also reduce the cost to striking workers as they are 
under less threat of being permanently replaced, and it may reduce 
costly picket line violence).61 
These results are not necessarily inconsistent with empirical 
work in the United States finding that strikes in which permanent 
replacements have been hired tend to last longer than strikes in 
which firms attempt to maintain operations by other means. 62 We 
cannot tell from these studies whether the use of replacements pro-
longs strikes, or whether firms use or threaten to use replacements 
when they anticipate a long, intractable dispute. Because these in-
vestigations do not control for all the relevant characteristics of the 
parties contributing to the nature of the dispute between them, the 
correlations found between strike duration and use of replacements 
may simply reflect, as the authors of one recent study acknowledge, 
61. Morley Gunderson et al., The Effects of Canadian Labour Relations Legislation on 
Strike Incidence and Duration, 41 LAB. LJ. 512, 517 (1990). A fuller account of this study 
can be found in their paper of the same title presented to the spring meeting of the Industrial 
Relations Research Association, Buffalo, New York, May 3, 1990 (on file with author). See 
also Gunderson & Melino, supra note 60. But see BUDD, supra note 59, at 21-22 (asserting 
that there is no evidence that Canadian strikebreaker legislation has had a significant impact 
on strike activity). Professors John Kennan and Robert Wilson argue that the Gunderson-
Melino findings are due to the fact that 
removing the firm's option to hire replacement workers increases the union's uncer-
tainty about the firm's reservation value. In the case of screening and signaling models, 
this greater uncertainty generates strikes that will be longer on average, although also 
wage settlements will be higher. In the case of an attrition model, the effect of a "no 
scab" law is to enlarge the pie, which directly reduces the quit rate of both parties and 
thtis leads to longer strikes and higher wage settlements on average. In all these models, 
therefore, one expects strikes to end more quickly, and wage settlements to be lower on 
average, if replacement workers are not precluded by a "no scab" law. 
JOHN KENNAN & ROBERT WILSON, STRATEGIC BARGAINING MODELS AND INTERPRETATION 
OF STRIKE DATA 35 (Stanford Ctr. on Conflict and Negotiation Working Paper No. 5, 1988) 
(footnote omitted). 
62. See supra note 55 (citing studies). 
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"a tendency on the part of employers expecting or actually exper-
iencing long strikes to announce the intent to hire, or actually hire, 
permanent replacements. "63 
In some instances, as in the disputes at Greyhound64 and at In-
ternational Paper in Jay, Maine,65 the use of replacements may have 
prolonged the strike because it complicated the union's ability to 
call a halt to a conflict that spelled job loss for many of its members 
- and possible loss of bargaining authority for the union. There 
are also examples like the Caterpillar-UAW dispute and others in 
which the firm's declared intention to hire permanent replacements 
effectively ended the strike.66 Even if we put aside other conse-
quences of strikebreaker legislation, and even if we thought that 
reducing strike duration was a sufficient justification for a policy 
change, the case remains to be made that restricting the hiring of 
permanent replacements will have the desired effe~t. 
D. The "Balance of Power" Thesis 
Ultimately, Mackay Radio's critics are worried about too few 
strikes occurring rather than too many. The incidence of strikes 
declined by fifty percent during the 1980s relative to the previous 
decade. 67 In Professor Matthew W. Finkin's terms, there has been 
63. Schnell & Gramm, supra note 55, at 203. At a 1991 conference sponsored by the 
Economic Policy Institute, Professor Gramm stated: 
There are a couple of possible explanations for the observed relationship between 
the use of permanent replacements and strike duration. One is that the use of replace-
ment workers (and particularly the use of permanent replacements) causes longer strike 
durations. The other possibility is that firms are more likely to hire replacement workers 
when they expect very long strikes. My gut feeling is that the first hypothesis accounts 
for much of the difference we observe, but we don't yet have studies that can separate 
out the magnitude of the two competing effects. 
Cynthia Gramm, Employers' Decisions to Operate During Strikes: Consequences and Policy 
Implications, in SEMINAR: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY - THE ISSUE OF 
REPLACEMENT WORKERS 33, 36 {Economic Policy Inst. ed., 1991) [hereinafter SEMINAR]. 
64. Professor Peter Cappelli of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School ob-
served that Greyhound's decision to hire permanent replacements in response to the strike of 
its drivers signalled " 'the collapse of traditional labor relations' . . . . 'Hiring permanent 
replacements means a labor strike is now a fight to the death, rather than a periodic test of 
wills.' " Thomas C. Hayes, Future of Labor Is Seen in Bus Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1990, 
at A18 (quoting Prof. Cappelli). 
65. See Julius Getman, The Strike at Jay, in SEMINAR, supra note 63, at 51, 54; Julius G. 
Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 
102 YALE LJ. 1803 (1993). 
66. One study notes that in the few cases in which firms hired permanent replacements, 
the "more typical[ ]" union response was "to soften its position and seek a quick settlement, 
as was the case in the clear majority of the cases.'' CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING 
DURING STRIKES 66 (1982). 
67. See U.S. GEN: AccoUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD 91-2, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA· 
TIONS: STRIKES AND 1HE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN TIIE 1970s AND 
1980s, at 12 (1991) (stating that strikes reported to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
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an "enervation of the economic strike": "the strike may no longer 
be a credible tool of agreement-making for those employees for 
whom the labor market presents little or no obstacle to their re-
placement. "68 In other words, Mackay Radio should be repealed in 
order "to right the balance of power between labor and manage-
ment, even if this leads to more strikes. 
It is difficult to say why the number of strikes has declined in the 
United States during this period. The level of strike activity is less a 
product of legal rules than of larger forces, such as aggregate de-
mand conditions, unemployment rates, and product market condi-
tions. 69 Indeed, Canada - which had experienced the highest rate 
of strikes from 1966 to 1975 among any nation except for Italy70 -
also reports a substantial decline in the incidence of strikes during 
the 1980s,71 despite legislative developments strengthening the posi-
tion of unions and protecting strikers from job loss. 
In any event, although - as developed below72 - we should be 
concerned about the apparently greater willingness of firms during 
the 1980s to resort to permanent replacements,73 the NLRA con-
fers no mandate on the Labor Board or the courts to devise rules 
that seek to achieve some abstract balance of power between labor 
and management. Although the NLRA's framers expressed the 
hope that collective bargaining would increase the purchasing 
power of workers as a means of drawing the nation out of the Great 
Depression,74 the statute they wrote only commits the parties to a 
Service (FMCS) dropped from about 2660 a year during the 1970s to 1250 a year during the 
1980s, with the greatest decline occurring between 1979 and 1983). 
68. Fmkin, supra note 35, at 547, 549. 
69. The economic literature on this issue is usefully explored in Sheena McConnell, Cycli-
cal Fluctuations in Strike Activity, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 130, 141 (1990) (finding that 
"the probability of a strike varies pro-cyclically with the inverse of the unemployment rate" 
and that "strikes are most likely in industries suffering low demand in regions with low 
unemployment"). 
70. See S.M. JAMIESON, INDUSTRIAL CoNFUcr IN CANADA 1966-1975, at 1-2 (Centre for 
the Study of Inflation and Productivity, Economic Council of Canada, Discussion Paper No. 
142, 1979), cited in ALTON WJ. CRAIG, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 
289 (3d ed. 1990). 
71. See CRAIG, supra note 70, at 288 tbl. 11.18. 
72. See infra text accompanying notes 98-101. 
73. There are, as yet, no definitive data to support this impression. A 1991 study by the 
General Accounting Office found that employers announced they would hire permanent 
replacements in about 31 % of strikes in 1985 that were reported to the FMCS and about 
35% of strikes in 1989, and actually hired permanent strike replacements in about 17% of 
strikes in each year. U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 67, at 13-18. Its poll of 
employer and union representatives also revealed a widely held belief among those surveyed 
that replacements were hired less often in the late 1970s than in the late 1980s. Id. at 18·19. 
74. Section 1 of the NLRA states in relevant part: 
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process of collective bargaining rather than to particular substantive 
outcomes. 
0 
The proceduralist thrust of the NLRA was quite deliberate. 
Both labor and management would have strongly opposed any gov-
ernment role in the setting of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.75 Senator Wagner initially omitted a good-faith bargaining 
requirement from his bill, fearing it would be vulnerable to the 
charge that he was seeking a form of compulsory arbitration of la-
bor disputes.76 The bill as it emerged from the Senate labor com-
mittee - and as it was enacted into law - contained such a 
requirement, but the committee report took pains 
to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is designed to 
compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental supervi-
sion of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collec-
tively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because 
the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to 
decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.77 
The climate in the postwar period was no more conducive to a 
government role in setting terms for labor and management. Gov-
ernment labor policy during World War II enhanced the institu-
tional position of unions but also dampened wages. Pent-up wage 
demands led to a wave of strikes in 1946 and 1947 that fueled infla-
tionary pressures and public sentiment in favor of curbing the 
power of unions.78 The Case Bill of 1946,79 a forerunner of Taft-
Hartley that would have prohibited secondary boycotts and extor-
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the 
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the 
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing 
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the 
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries. 
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The economic theory underlying this statement is ques-
tioned in Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemplbyment, and the Wagner Act: A Critical 
Reappraisa~ 38 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1073-76 (1986). 
75. The American Federation of Labor consistently opposed "compulsory arbitration, 
compulsory investigation of industrial disputes, industrial courts, and similar devices which 
involve limitations upon the right to strike and regulation of relations between employers 
and employees by law." LEWIS L. LoRWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 401-02 
(1933). 
76. See JAMES A. GRoss, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD 
137 (1974). 
77. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEms. HIST., supra 
note 21, at 2312. 
78. See ToMLINS, supra note 20, at 253-56. 
79. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). 
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tion,80 would have become law but for President Truman's veto.81 
In 1947, the bill that passed the House would have banned industry-
wide collective bargaining because of its wage-pushing inflationary 
effects.82 As enacted into law, the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
NLRA outlawed secondary boycotts and several other restraints on 
union weapons and removed any ambiguity in the original Wagner 
Act suggesting that the NLRB had authority to infer from the ab-
sence of agreement or substantive rigidity of bargaining positions 
that a party had not bargained in good faith.83 Thus, the Supreme 
Court later observed: "[A]llowing the Board to compel agreement 
when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the 
fundamental premise on which the Act is based - private bargain-
ing under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, with-
out any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract. "84 
Removing a countermeasure from the employer's arsenal is, of 
course, not the same thing as writing a contract for the parties. But, 
as Justice Brennan's landmark decision in NLRB v. Insurance 
Agents' International Union85 makes clear, government regulation 
of bargaining tactics in the service of promoting a balance of power 
between labor and management cuts against the grain of this statute 
and is difficult to square with the statutory commitment to free col-
lective bargaining.86 
80. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 7, §§ 1-6, sec. 11 (1946). 
81. See JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF TIIE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSmON, 1937-1947, at 252 (1981). 
82. See id. at 254-55; Mitchell, supra note 74, at 1071. 
83. The Taft-Hartley amendments added§ 8(d), which provides in relevant part: "[S]uch 
obligation [to bargain collectively in good faith] does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession .••. " 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988); see H.K. 
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (holding that§ 8(d) also operates as a constraint on 
the NLRB's remedial authority); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 
(1960) (stating that"§ 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from control-
ling the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements"). 
84. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 108. 
85. 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
86. 
And if the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as 
part of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable influence 
upon the substantive terms on which the parties contract. As the parties' own devices 
became more limited, the Government might have to enter even more directly into the 
negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy is not presently erected on a 
foundation of government control of the results of negotiations. Nor does it contain a 
charter for the NLRB to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power be-
tween employer and union. 
361 U.S. at 490 (citation omitted). 
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III. A COLLECTIVE PROCESS-BASED THEORY FOR REFORM OF 
MACKAY RADIO 
As I suggested in a 1987 article,87 we need a theory of the role of 
the strike and strike replacements in the process of collective bar-
gaining that accords with the central premises of the NLRA. 
A. Central Premises of the NLRA 
I take the premises of the NLRA to be the following: 
First, workers have a right to opt for collective representation in 
setting the terms and conditions of employment. 
Second, the law protects the freedom of workers meaningfully 
to decide whether to be represented on a collective basis, but it is 
otherwise indifferent to the extent of unionization or the extent of 
coverage of union contracts. Absent from our law is the provision 
of German law permitting extension by administrative fiat of collec-
tive bargaining agreements to nonunion firms. The NLRA, includ-
ing the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments,88 and in particular section 
7's recognition of the employee's "right to refrain" from union ac-
tivities,89 reflects a public policy that does not seek to promote the 
spread of unions where it is not otherwise sought by the affected 
employees. 
Third, the NLRA assumes there is a problem of inequality of 
bargaining power when individual workers negotiate terms of em-
ployment with firms. Congress, in the language of section 1, sought 
to redress "[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees 
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of 
contract, and employers."90 The import of this latter assumption is 
that for workers who have opted for collective representation, the 
statute seeks to promote a process by which the workers acting as a 
group negotiate terms with their employer, even if the employer 
would prefer to deal with its employees on some other basis. 
Fourth, again within the domain of the statutory scheme as it 
presently stands, the problem of inequality of bargaining power is 
thought to be corrected by the ability of workers to invoke the col-
lective representation option and the statutory protection of their 
declared preference for collective bargaining. Unlike the Fair La-
87. See Estreicher, supra note*. 
88. LMRA, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61Stat.136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141-197 (1988)). 
89. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). 
90. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); see supra note 74. I leave for another occasion 
whether this is a sound diagnosis of some or all labor markets. 
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bor Standards Act of 193891 or the laws common in European coun-
tries, the NLRA does not stipulate the minimum terms under which 
workers may be employed. Nor, as we have seen, is it a law requir-
ing the parties to reach any particular outcome or any agreement at 
all. 
Rather, the NLRA is an essentially proceduralist statute that fa-
cilitates collective bargaining without nullifying the influence of 
market forces. The parties at the table are not insulated from the 
forces of competition, whether between firms in the product market 
or between union and nonunion workers in the labor market. 
Some may argue that the purpose of the NLRA is to eliminate 
competition in the labor market - "to take wages out of competi-
tion." That is certainly an objective of unions, and where such com-
petition is eliminated, unions are at their strongest point.92 It is also 
true that, as a general matter, unions enjoy an immunity from the 
antitrust laws in pursuing that objective.93 The NLRA, however, 
aids that objective only in the very limited sense of providing a col-
lective representation option and insisting on good-faith collective 
bargaining once that option has been exerci~ed. The NLRA does 
not itself eliminate or seek to eliminate labor-market competition. 
B. Unraveling the Paradox of Mackay Radio 
From these premises, I believe we can derive a theory of the 
role of the strike and strike replacements as well as a basis for eval-
uating current arrangements. Certainly, other theories flowing 
from different premises are possible. Professors George Cohen and 
Michael Wachter, for example, have offered a defense of Mackay 
Radio based on efficiency considerations in internal labor mar-
kets.94 Writers wishing to bolster union bargaining power would 
91. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 {1988). 
92. The premise of my recent Piper eecture in Labor Law, see Estreicher, Labor Law 
Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, supra note 11, and my upcoming book is 
that a new labor relations system, and a new role for unions, is needed in a world in which 
competitive product markets make it increasingly difficult to take wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment out of competition. 
93. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 {1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 
U.S. 469 {1940). 
94. See George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law 
and Economics Approach, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 41, at 109; Michael L. 
Wachter, Does the NLRA Protect Union or Firm Rent-Seeking? 24-27 (Feb. 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). As a positive theory of the NLRA, Cohen and 
Wachter overstate the statutory commitment to efficiency. Under the statute, workers are 
permitted, for example, to forge alliances seeking to eliminate entirely labor-market competi-
tion in their industry. For other criticism, see infra note 97. 
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offer a very different, wealth-redistributive view.95 Such theories, 
however, require independent justification from first principles. 
Moreover, they would require a reassessment of the entire statutory 
scheme, rather than an isolated change in the rules governing the 
reinstatement rights of strikers and leaving all other aspects of the 
NLRA essentially intact. 
Consistent with the premises outlined above, the only justifica-
tion, in my view, for allowing employers to hire permanent replace-
ments in the course of a strike is that the statute does not eliminate 
the role of labor-market competition - of competition among 
workers - in the setting of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Hence, the risk of permanent replacement serves as a mar-
ket-based check on unreasonable union demands at the bargaining 
table. 
There are, of course, other checks on union demands, notably 
the limited ability of many workers, even when aided by union 
strike funds and state laws extending unemployment benefits, to 
pay for the necessities of life without working. The NLRA does 
not, however, insulate workers from labor-market competition even 
if their union were willing to invest its entire strike treasury on a 
particular dispute, or if all strikers were able to secure temporary 
employment elsewhere, to facilitate a strike of indefinite duration. 
But that is only half of the story. It is also a central premise of 
the statute that when workers have opted for collective representa-
tion, the terms of the labor contract are to be determined by what 
workers organized collectively will accept, not by what individual 
workers are willing to accept. Collective bargaining is not quite the 
same thing as "collective begging," a term of derision used by advo-
cates of Mackay Radio's repeal.96 Thus, we also have to ask 
whether there is a corresponding collective-labor check on unrea-
sonable management deman<;ls. Given the congressional judgment, 
it is not a sufficient answer to say that such a check comes from the 
willingness of individual replacement workers to brave the picket 
line and work on the terms of management's final offer to the 
union. The very inequality of individual worker bargaining power 
that led Congress to enact a collective representation option cannot 
help but influence the reservation wage of individual replacement 
95. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Whither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in 
the Workplace, 100 YALE LJ. 2767 {1991). 
96. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to 
Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 397, 420 {1992); Pollitt, supra note 18, at 
297; William D. Turner, Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining: Prohibiting Discrimina-
tion Against Economic Strikers, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 685, 690 (1994). 
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workers and hence the content of management's final offer to the 
union.97 
Mackay Radio seems, on one level, to permit this paradoxical 
result. On another level, if we consider the union density levels of 
the 1940s and 1950s, it is possible to argue that firms could often 
expect that at the end of a strike, replacement workers would either 
support the preexisting union or enlist the services of another labor 
organization. It is this prospect of continuing union organization at 
strike's end that, in my view, provides the necessary moderating in-
fluence of a collective employee check on management demands at 
the bargaining table. That check acts to ensure that management, 
too, faces the right incentives from the standpoint of the statute.98 
There are many explanations for the decline in union density. 
The fall in the unionization rate may reflect changes in worker pref-
erences and product market conditions that the law itself cannot 
alter but that call for a different role for unions and for facilitating 
legal change.99 Some of the explanation may also lie, as Professor 
97. By contrast, Cohen and Wachter argue: 
The line drawn by Mackay Radio is consistent with the efficiency model .•. because 
the rule helps deter opportunistic behavior by both sides in the [internal labor market 
(ILM)]. Recall that in the ILM, sunk, firm-specific investments by both parties create 
the potential for opportunistic behavior. Suppose that a strike occurs because a firm 
with monopsony power in the ILM has demanded that the workers agree to lower future 
wage rates, that is, a lower expected return on their sunk investments. If the firm's 
product market conditions have not changed, then such a demand by the firm is an 
opportunistic threat rather than an efficient adjustment as long as the prevailing wage 
rates represent a competitive return on workers' investments. In this case, striking 
workers would have little to fear from replacement workers, because these replacements 
would not accept jobs that offer a stream of future wages below competitive levels. Al· 
ternatively, any replacement workers who accepted jobs would be reluctant to make 
sunk investments in a firm that had developed a reputation for opportunistic behavior, 
Cohen & Wachter, supra note 94, at 118. 
This view is problematic on a number of grounds. Frrst, Cohen and Wachter have no 
explanation for the role of unions and collective bargaining in firms not characterized by 
ILMs. Second, even for ILM-type firms, they substantially overstate the role of reputation 
costs, particularly for firms that have changed location or operations and perhaps have less 
need for firm-specific worker investments in the future. Third, they fail to take into account 
the possibility that what may look like cheating on relational contracts for the strikers may be 
a good deal for a different group of workers - replacements and crossovers - because 
when the latter group obtains employment during a strike, changes in product markets, in 
labor market supply, or in the skills needed for these jobs may have altered that group's 
marginal productivity calculus. Finally, and most importantly, the Cohen-Wachter analysis 
- though purporting to provide a positive theory of the NLRA - does not give due recog· 
nition to the congressional intent to provide a collective employee check on management 
demands at the bargaining table. 
98. The suggestion here is that the framers of the NLRA envisioned significant union 
density levels in fashioning the model of economic conflict authorized by the statute. They 
did not, however, make any affirmative provision for ensuring the maintenance of any partic-
ular level of unionization. 
99. This is essentially the view I take in Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of 
Competitive Product Markets, supra note 11. 
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Paul Weiler has suggested,100 in the remedial deficiencies of the 
statute. 
Whatever the causes of the decline in union density, under pres-
ent conditions Mackay Radio threatens to unravel the statutory 
scheme. This is particularly true given the existing rules that allow 
representational issues to be decided during the course of a strike. 
Those rules empower employers to treat a strike, not simply as a 
dispute resolution mechanism consistent with a continuation of the 
bargaining relationship at strike's end, but as an occasion for elimi-
nating that relationship.101 
C. The Proposal 
This state of affairs requires legislative action. How should the 
law be changed? 
1. The Case Against a Per Se Ban on Permanent Replacements 
One option is the current legislative initiative to overturn Mac-
kay Radio. A per se prohibition on the hiring of permanent 
replacements would, in my view, substantially diminish the influ-
ence of labor-market competition in the setting of terms and condi-
tions of employment in the union sector. If an employer cannot 
maintain operations by other means or withdraw its capital by relo-
cating operations elsewhere, such a prohibition effectively insulates 
labor demands from market checks.102 Collective bargaining 
100. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under 
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983). 
101. The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 
775 (1990), mitigates the potential to use permanent replacements as a means of ousting 
unions by requiring employers to prove some basis for believing that replacement workers do 
not support the striking union before withdrawing recognition from the union. Given the 
union's objective at strike's end to obtain the return of strik~rs to their jobs, however, there 
will often be a conflict of interest between returning strikers and replacements that should 
not be difficult to prove. Proposals in the literature include adoption by the NLRB of an 
"economic strike bar" to considering representational questions during an active strike, see 
Joan Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Penna-
nent Replacements, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 691 (1988), and barring employers from unilaterally 
withdrawing recognition from unions, see Douglas E. Ray, Withdrawal of Recognition After 
Curtin Matheson: A House Built Upon Sand, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 265 (1991). For my views, 
see infra text accompanying note 120. 
102. Bargaining outcomes under such a regime would be largely determined from the 
firm's standpoint by the extent of prestrike stockpiling, the durability of relationships with 
suppliers and customers, and the firm's ability to mechanize operations sufficiently so that 
managers can perform unit work during strikes. From the union's standpoint, bargaining 
outcomes would be determined by the size of strike funds, the availability of unemployment 
compensation under state law, and alliances· with other unions such as truckers. I do not 
believe that - under these conditions - the parties would face the right incentives to re-
solve disputes in a manner that promotes the long-term competitive health of firms in the 
union sector. 
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should not be an endurance contest. If the employer has met its 
bargaining obligations and is fully prepared to continue to deal col-
lectively with its employees at strike's end, and if sufficient time has 
passed for the informational and signaling benefits of the conflict to 
manifest themselves, there has to be a mechanism for testing the 
reasonableness of the union's demands in the marketplace. The 
ability. to hire replacements willing to work on the basis of the 
firm's final offer to the union provides that check.1°3 
It is true that even without Mackay Radio firms will continue to 
face product-market competition, and many unions will be as con-
cerned as management with reducing the firm's competitive disad-
vantage, even if this means adjusting wages, work rules, and the 
like. These are situations for which Mackay Radio is largely irrele-
vant: the parties will ordinarily be able to adjust their differences 
without strikes, or, if occasional strikes occur to keep management 
convinced of the union's effectiveness or to lower union members' 
expectations,104 the strikes will be relatively short in duration. 
Some bargaining relationships, however, are marred by distrust 
on both sides, and a long strike will typically be necessary to com-
municate employees' resolve to management or to convince em-
ployees of economic constraints operating on the firm. In yet other 
situations, the interests of the union and the firm may not be en-
tirely congruent because the union may be concerned about the im-
plications of an agreement that adversely affects its bargaining 
position in other units - as is arguably the case in the Caterpillar-
UAW dispute105 - or because the union is catering to the prefer-
ences of long-service workers who benefit, say, from restrictive 
103. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying note 110, the struck firm's ability to 
attract temporary workers will not necessarily provide this check if adequate numbers of 
qualified workers woul? be available for permanent, but not temporary, employment. See 
Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the Sub· 
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
193-94 (1991) (statement of Prof. David Westfall); Corbett, supra note 4, at 875; Michael H. 
LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker Replacements: Combination, 
Conspiracy, Concert, and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L. REv. 257, 305-06 (1993). 
104. See Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and 
Industrial Strike Activity, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 35, 37 (1969). 
105. In a number of highly publicized strikes, unions have allowed constituencies other 
than the immediately affected workers to determine the outcome of strike and contract ratifi· 
cation votes. See, e.g., Henry J. Holcomb, Port workers reject pact, face job loss, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Sept. 29, 1993, at A-1 (reporting that Wilmington port workers voted against a 
concession pact for Philadelphia port workers, even though a Chilean fruit shipper 
threatened to divert traffic to a lower-cost Wiimington port); Alex S. Jones, Paper 
Brinksmanship: Tunes and Drivers Are Joined in Fear Both Would Lose All-Out Labor War, 
N.Y. T!MEs, May 15, 1992, at B2 (reporting that a deal between the New York Times and its 
drivers would be subject to a majority vote of the entire union, including drivers for its com· 
petitors, the Daily News and the New York Post). 
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work rules and who will not yield those rules absent a palpable cri-
sis affecting their jobs.106 
Mackay Radio is relevant to these latter situations of bargaining 
failure. When the firm is unable to continue operations by other 
means, the firm should not be locked into an acceptance of the 
union's demands; rather, it should be able to force a marketplace 
test of the union's bargaining position. If the employer makes 
known at the outset its intention to hire permanent replacements, it 
can minimize the need for an endurance contest and avoidable job 
loss for strikers, as well as induce an earlier moderation of the 
union's demands.107 
2. Requiring a Prior Showing of Business Necessity 
The objective of labor law reform in this area should be to de-
vise a means of minimizing the strategic use of Mackay Radio108 -
that is, when firms permanently replace strikers for the purpose of 
ousting the union and deterring future unionization rather than in 
the interest of maintaining operations in the face of a strike -
106. See generally Bruce E. Kaufman & Jorge Martinez-Vasquez, Monopoly, Efficient 
Contract, and Median Voter Models of Union Wage Determination: A Critical Comparison, 
11 J. LAB. REs. 401, 414-18 (1990). 
107. In a last-minute, unsuccessful attempt to overcome the June 1992 Senate filibuster 
on S. 55, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), Senators Packwood of Oregon and Metzenbaum of 
Ohio, with labor backing, offered a compromise that would have made a proffer of binding 
interest arbitration a mandatory condition to resort to economic conflict. Under this propo-
sal, an employer who refused to participate in arbitration or to accept an arbitration award 
could not hire permanent replacements; if the union chose to strike without proffering inter-
est arbitration or accepting the award, the employer would be free to use such replacements. 
See 138 CoNG. REc. 88056-89 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (amendments to S. 55 nos. 2047-94 
submitted by Sen. Packwood), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 115, at D-1 to D-4 
(June 15, 1992). 
Although an improvement over a flat-out ban, this proposal suffers from the infirmity of 
empowering a third party who is likely to be unfamiliar with the competitive pressures oper-
ating on the firm to decide the fate of the firm. Interest arbitration is often used in public-
sector disputes in which strikes are outlawed and public employers do not face the demands 
of competitive markets. If arbitration is used as a means of avoiding resort to permanent 
replacements, it should be advisory only and should provide for an exceedingly prompt 
award that does not delay resolution of the dispute. For an interesting proposal along these 
lines, see George S. Roukis & Mamdouh I. Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent 
Striker Replacement Strategy, 44 LAB. LJ. 80, 89-90 (1993) (proposing submission of un-
resolved issues to advisory arbitration and imposition of mild sanctions as an additional set-
tlement impetus). 
108. In my 1987 article, Estreicher, supra note *, at 906-07, I favored overturning Bel-
knap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), which allows state law to intervene in a manner that 
stiffens the resolve of the firm to end the relationship with the union rather than settle the 
strike. I now believe that it is desirable that management not be able to promise permanent 
employment to replacements as a means of defeating a strike and yet be free to disregard 
that promise depending on the outcome of the strike. Although the NLRA should be 
deemed to preempt any state law requiring specific performance of the promise of perma-
nent employment, employers should have to pay substitutional relief to replacements who 
are displaced by returning strikers. 
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while preserving the beneficial check on union demands for em-
ployers who cannot maintain operations without hiring replace-
ments. This statement of the objective suggests that all that is 
needed is a rejection of the irrebuttable presumption in the Mackay 
Radio opinion that permanent replacements are always needed to 
maintain operations.109 
Under this view, the firm would have to make an affirmative 
showing that it could not maintain operations with temporary help 
before resorting to permanent replacements. A firm that can at-
tract temporary replacements on the terms of its final offer to the 
union has no need for permanent replacements and should not be 
allowed to inflict permanent job loss without economic justification. 
It is often thought that a requirement of a showing of business 
necessity would effectively eliminate the use of permanent replace-
ments, either because temporary replacements can always be found 
on the terms offered to striking workers,110 or because the legal un-
certainty of a post-hoc administrative inquiry would make the step 
too costly for employers to consider. 
In my view, a prior showing of business necessity should be re-
quired only if an administrative mechanism is available for ob-
taining a prompt declaratory ruling, keying the availability of 
temporary replacements to objective indicators, such as unemploy-
ment rates in the particular locality or industry. Uncertainty is un-
fair to workers who should not have to bet their jobs on the hope 
that the Labor Board will at some point in the distant future treat 
them as "unfair labor practice strikers" entitled to displace their 
replacements. Employers, too, should be able to respond to union 
demands with a minimum of legal uncertainty. We also lose a good 
deal of the educative value of the risk of permanent replacement as 
a moderating influence on bargaining positions if the employer's 
right to hire such replacements will be determined in post-hoc, fact-
intensive proceedings years after the strike is over. During the 
strike, both the firm and its striking workers should be operating 
with complete information about the true risk of permanent 
replacement. 
109. See authorities cited supra in note 15. 
110. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 3, at 267-68. Weiler also seems to suggest that the 
required showing almost never could be made because employers rarely promise truly per-
manent status to replacements. See id. He is certainly right that any promise made to 
replacements is contingent on the outcome of the negotiations with the union, but the prom-
ise of status as regular, not temporary, employees who will not necessarily be bumped at 
strike's end and who, if they are bumped, may have recall rights under the labor agreement 
has economic value to replacement workers. 
December 1994] Reflections on Antistrikebreaker ·Legislation 605 
Moreover, while such a showing would be based in part on un-
employment rates in particular industries and regions, it would also 
have to take account of the educational, skill, and motivational re-
quirements of the positions in question.111 Competitive forces buf-
feting American companies, particularly in manufacturing, are 
transforming the traditional workplace. In many industries, job re-
quirements for operators and technicians have expanded in recent 
years as employers have taken advantage of advances in computer-
based technology to delegate what had been managerial and super-
visory tasks to teams of front-line workers.112 These positions re-
quire better educated workers who are willing to cross-train and 
able to function effectively in a team-based system. The availability 
of such workers is not likely to be fully captured by unemployment 
statistics, and extensive reliance on temporary help is likely to be 
inconsistent with the high level of commitment to firm objectives 
required of front-line workers in this new environment.113 
If both of these qualifications - prompt determinations and 
true measures of the availability of temporary help - are accepted, 
any prior showing of business necessity will have "bite" only for 
unskilled, high-turnover positions and, for other positions, only in 
areas where there is a high rate of unemployment of educated, 
skilled workers. 
111. Some of my students have suggested that if an employer were in fact able to secure 
temporary replacements during a strike, there would b!'I no further need for inquiry into the 
question of business necessity for hiring permanent replacements. Though this is a plausible 
position, I am inclined to favor an approach to proof of the business necessity question that is 
not dependent on the actual behavior of the particular employer. The students' suggested 
approach has several drawbacks. First, those employers who are determined to pursue the 
permanent replacement route would have an incentive to "reveal" difficulties in hiring suita-
ble temporary workers. Second, if the test were dependent on the employer's poststrike 
behavior, it would be exceedingly difficult for the NLRB (or other agency) to provide a 
prompt ruling on business necessity so that the parties could structure their prospective con-
duct with complete information about their respective rights. Finally, because employers will 
do what they must to maintain operations, the fact that they have hired temporary workers 
does not conclusively show that they have been able to secure workers of the caliber they 
would hire under nonstrike conditions. For all these reasons, it is best to develop an early 
declaratory ruling procedure that is based on objective labor market information offering 
meaningful availability figures; if this is not feasible, the business necessity requirement 
should be abandoned. 
112. For some of the labor-law implications of this workplace transformation, see Samuel 
Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The Case for Par-
tial Repeal of§ 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 125 (1994). 
113. See supra note 111. Even if the company prior to the strike uses some contract 
workers already, that does not necessarily mean it could function effectively with an all-
temporary work force. In site visits I made to a number of "high performance" nonunion 
companies, I found that only a small percentage (5-10%) of the work force was comprised of 
contract workers, typically in supplementary maintenance functions. 
606 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:577 
3. A Six-Month Moratorium Period on Job Loss Due to the 
Hiring of Permanent Replacements 
Even when the employer is able to obtain a declaratory ruling 
that temporary workers are not available in sufficient number and 
quality to meet its requirements - or if the administrative difficul-
ties of providing such a ruling argue against requiring a showing of 
business necessity - there remains a need for a substantial morato-
rium period during which the process of collective bargaining has a 
chance to work free of labor-market pressures. I favor the ap-
proach that was Ontario law until very recently - requiring rein-
statement of strikers who announce their intention to return to 
work at any point within the first six months of a strike.114 
A clearly defined period of immunity from permanent replace-
ment is desirable. It encourages the parties to continue talking 
even though a strike has occurred, yet it preserves the corrective 
influence of the prospect of permanent replacements. Moreover, it 
helps avoid mistakes; workers are not rashly betting their jobs. By 
striking, workers indicate the intensity of their preferences and test 
the employer's resolve and ability to operate without them. After 
six months, any useful information of this type has already been 
imparted; workers who persist in their demands do so at peril of 
losing their jobs if they misjudge their bargaining position. 
Advocates of a flat-out repeal of Mackay Radio criticize this six-
month moratorium approach for allowing employers bent on oust-
ing the union to prolong disputes beyond the sixth month. Six 
months is, however, a long time in the life of any company to en-
dure the disruption of a strike - particularly during a period when 
firms maintain "just-in-time" inventory levels.us And under my 
proposal, developed below, the Labor Board would be authorized 
to avoid representational issues in the course of an active strike. 
Under these restraints, economic factors rather than purely strate-
gic maneuvers are likely to be dominant. If the strike nevertheless 
persists, we have a fundamental dispute over terms to be resolved 
114. I would not, however, import the administrative gloss of the Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Board in Shaw-Almex Indus., 15 C.L.R.B. Rep. 23, affd., 87 C.L.L.C. 14,019 {1986). 
According to Brian Shell, an Ontario solicitor: "When the only issue still in dispute [even 
?fier the six-month period] is who gets recalled, Shaw-Almex holds that it is unlawful for the 
employer to insist on keeping replacements at work, letting the strikers return only as vacan-
cies occur." See Brian Shell, The Rights of Strikers and Their Unions in Canada, in SEMINAR, 
supra note 63, at 81, 87. 
115. See, e.g., UAW Calls Strike at GM's Buick City Assembly Plant; Other Closures 
Likely, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-13, A-14 (Sept. 28, 1994) (noting the vulnera-
bility of automobile manufacturers to debilitating strikes because of their reliance on just-in-
time parts delivery systems). 
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in the marketplace. A rule barring the hiring of permanent replace-
ments in such circumstances may strengthen the union's position in 
a particular dispute; it does not, however, improve the economic 
position of the union-represented firm or the relationship between 
the parties. 
4. Mandatory Strike Ballots on the Employer's Final Offer 
Ensuring accuracy of information is vital to this vision of the 
bargaining process. I favor the rule present in many of the Cana-
dian provinces that requires mandatory strike votes on the basis of 
the employer's final offer to the union. The University of Toronto 
study mentioned above116 indicates that this rule has had a signifi-
cant impact in reducing both the incidence and longevity of 
strikes.117 It does so by reducing principal-agency problems be-
tween the union and its members and by imparting information to 
the employer about the workers' preferences and their collective 
resolve.118 Congress should amend the NLRA to give all workers 
in the bargaining unit, including fee-paying nonmembers of the 
union, the right to vote both on the employer's final offer and on 
strike authorization.119 Also, the employer should be permitted to 
address the workers on the terms of its final offer in the presence of 
the union. 
5. Avoiding Resolution of Representational Disputes During an 
Active Strike 
In order to reduce further the strategic use of Mackay Radio 
and to enhance the prospect of continuing union organization at 
strike's end as a check on management demands, the NLRA should 
be amended to authorize the NLRB to decline to consider a ques-
tion concerning representation during the course of an active labor 
dispute - say, for strikes of up to twelve months' duration. More-
over, employers should be required to petition for an election if 
116. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
117. See Gunderson & Melino, supra note 60, at 313-14. 
118. Id. at 301. 
119. The Taft-Hartley experience with employee votes on management's final offer sug-
gests, however, that employees will typically vote to reject See DONALD E. CuLLEN, NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY STRIKES 56-57, 61 (1968). It is unclear whether this would occur 
generally outside of Taft-Hartley's "emergency disputes" context. See LMRA, Pub. L. No. 
80-101, §§ 206-210, 61 Stat. 155-56 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1988)). 
In any event, whether or not the procedure reduces the incidence of strikes, employers -
and the public - should know that the strike enjoys the informed support of the affected 
employees rather than adherence to a top-down direction from union leadership. 
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they want to test the striking union's continued majority.120 These 
steps should diminish the incentive firms currently have to use the 
strike as a weapon to eliminate the union altogether. 
6. Curbing Picket-Line Violence 
Finally, I also favor a stronger federal role in curbing acts of 
violence by unions or their supporters during strikes.121 There is a 
tendency for local authorities to condone such violence, which 
places illegitimate pressure on firms to give in to union demands. 
When permanent replacements are hired after six months - and 
after obtaining a declaratory ruling as to the unavailability of tem-
porary replacements - management would be exercising a lawful 
right and would be entitled to the law's assistance.122 
CONCLUSION 
The strike is a necessary part of collective bargaining. Workers 
should not ordinarily lose their jobs by pressing their disputes in 
this manner. But neither should strikes be viewed as a risk-free 
means of empowering unions to lock employers into uncompetitive 
contracts. The approach outlined above would more effectively 
align collective bargaining under current conditions with the central 
premises of the NLRA than would either the Cesar Chavez Work-
place Fairness bill or the continuation of Mackay Radio. 
120. In my article, Estreicher, Labor Law Reform for a World of Competitive Markets, 
supra note 11, I advocate amending the NLRA to prevent employers from withdrawing rec-
ognition from unions except through a test of the union's majority in a secret-ballot election. 
Conceivably, one might interpret the Supreme Court to have left open the validity of unilat-
eral withdrawal of recognition in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 
n.8 (1990). See Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, NLRB v. 
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (No. 88-1685). Thus, even within ex-
isting law, the NLRB may have authority to require representational issues in the course of a 
strike to be resolved only by Board-conducted elections. 
121. See generally ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR. & THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNION Vm. 
LENCE: THE RECORD AND THE REsPONSE BY CoURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB (La-
bor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 25, 1983). For an example of violence to 
replacement workers, see Brown & Sharpe Mfg., 299 N.L.R.B. 586 (1990). 
122. Several other important issues remain to be worked out: (i) the possibility of differ-
ent rules for first-time contract situations; (ii) the wisdom of disenfranchising replaced strik-
ers after a strike has gone on for more than one year; and (iii) the merits of continuing to 
condone special rules for unfair labor practice strikes - the principal justification for which 
may have been that it served as a second-best corrective for Mackay Radio. 
